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13.1 We think it appropriate to emphasise here the caveats which we set out in the introductory section to this report. In particular, we have had very limited access to documents of BFS or SIMEX in Singapore and we have not been able to conduct formal interviews with the senior management, or more junior staff, of BFS in Singapore. Nor have we been able to see the work papers of, or interview, BFS's auditors. Further, Leeson, the General Manager and Head Trader of BFS - who, from any viewpoint, is a central figure in the events leading to the collapse of Barings - has not provided any information to this inquiry or given his own explanation of events. His response has been confined to the letter from his solicitors noted in paragraph 1.77.

13.2 Nevertheless, on the basis of the information provided to us we consider that a number of conclusions can be drawn.
13.3 The key questions are:

(a) how were the massive losses incurred?

(b) why was the true position not noticed earlier?

13.4 Our conclusions, in summary, are:

(a) the losses were incurred by reason of unauthorised and concealed trading activities within BFS;

(b) the true position was not noticed earlier by reason of a serious failure of controls and managerial confusion within Barings;

(c) the true position had not been detected prior to the collapse by the external auditors, supervisors or regulators of Barings.

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