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| | 5. Suitability of capital structure |
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Illustrative examples
5. Suitability of capital structure
The following example shows it is possible, at group level, that insurance risks are covered by banking capital (or vice-versa), even when the bank and the insurer that constitute the group each fulfil their solo capital requirements. Definitions of capital eligible for regulatory purposes differ considerably between regulatory disciplines and regulators carrying out an analysis of capital adequacy at group level should duly take into account these differences when assessing the suitability of capital elements to cover certain risks, as described in paragraph 37 of the Capital Adequacy Principles paper. - A parent life insurance company has own funds of 500, of which 200 is paid-up share capital (also recognised by banking regulators);
- The remaining 300 stems from profit reserves appearing in the balance sheet and future profits, capital components which are only recognised by insurance regulators;
- The insurance company has a 100% participation in a bank subsidiary with a book value of 250. It therefore complies with its capital requirement of 250.
- In addition to the 250 paid-up share capital furnished by the insurance parent, the banking subsidiary has hidden reserves and reserves for general banking risk of 50 which - by definition - are not elements recognised as liable funds by insurance regulators. Its capital requirement is 300.
An undifferentiated, purely quantitative, calculation, based on the risk-based aggregation method, identifies a balanced capital position at group level with the sum of the capital elements equalling the capital requirements:
| Capital of Insurance Parent | Capital of Banking Subsidiary |
Profit Reserves, Future Profits |
300 |
Paid-Up Share Capital | 250 |
| Paid-Up Share Capital | 200 | Hidden Reserves and Reserves for General Banking Use | 50 |
| Less Book Value of Participation | 250 | | |
| Net Capital | 250 | Net Capital | 300 |
| Capital Req't | 250 | Capital Req't | 300 |
Analysis reveals a deficit in group-wide capital for banking risk; leaving the question of overall capital adequacy to each individual supervisor:-
| Capital Requirements |
| | Banking Risk | Insurance Risk | Excess/Deficit |
| 300 | 250 | |
| Insurance Capital 300 | | 250 | 50 |
| Banking Capital 50 | 50 | | 0 |
| "All-round" Capital 200 | 200 | | | | Excess/Deficit | - 50 | 0 | |
The capital charge for insurance risk of 250 is more than covered by the 300 units of capital recognised only by insurance regulators; there is an excess of 50 units. The capital charge for banking risk of 300 is covered by 50 units of capital recognised only by banking regulators and by 200 units of capital recognised under both supervisory regimes; but the remaining charge of 50 is effectively covered by insurance capital - i.e. by capital components which banking regulators have deemed unsuitable for covering banking risks.
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Risk Library *
Documents by Author *
Committees at the Bank for International Settlement (BIS) *
Supervision of Financial Conglomerates *
Supplement to the Capital Adequacy Principles paper *
Illustrative examples
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